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Abstract 
Plenty of in-process vulnerabilities are blamed on 
various out of bound memory accesses. Previous 
prevention methods are mainly based on software 
checking associated with performance overhead, while 
traditional hardware protection mechanisms only work 
for inter-process memory accesses. In this paper we 
propose a novel hardware based in-process isolation 
system called PULP (Protection by User Level 
Partition). PULP modifies processor core by 
associating program counter and virtual memory 
address to achieve in-process data isolation.  
PULP partitions the program into two distinct parts, 
one is reliable, called primary functions, and the other 
is unreliable, called secondary functions, the accessible 
memory range of which can be configured via APIs. 
PULP automatically checks the memory bound when 
executing load/store operations in secondary functions. 
A RISC-V based FPGA prototype is implementated 
and functional test shows that PULP can effectively 
prevent in-process bug, including the Heartbleed and 
other buffer overflow vulnerabilities, etc. 
The total runtime overhead of PULP is negligible, as 
there is no extra runtime overhead besides configuring 
the API. We run SPEC2006 to evaluate the average 
performance, considering the LIBC functions as 
secondary functions. Experimental timing results show 
that, running bzip2, mcf, and libquantum, PULP bears 
low runtime overhead (less than 0.1%). 
Analysis also shows that PULP can be used effectively  
to prevent the newest “Spectre” bug which threats 
nearly all out-of-order processors. 
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1 Introduction 
Many scenarios could induce in-process 
vulnerabilities, leading to information leakage and 
control flow corruption. Applications always call 
third-party library or components, which are not 
controlled by programmer and may have security 
vulnerabilities. When the calling function transmits 
parameters to the called function, the latter cannot 
ascertain the expected range of the parameters, buffer 
overflow may be brought in and the control flow may 
be deviated. By injecting malformed codes into a 
victim program’s address space or using ROP like 
techniques, attackers could steal sensitive data from 
victim program. 
Recently, “Spectre” exploit critical vulnerabilities 
in modern Out-of-Order processors to bypass software 
boundary check. Spectre[1] involves victim to 
speculatively perform operations that would not occur 
during correct program execution and may probably 
leak the victim’s confidential information via a side 
channel to the adversary. 
There have been various methods to mitigate 
inner-process vulnerabilities, such as MPX etc. 
However, they are mostly based on software checking 
or software enforced range checking. The drawback 
is, 1. need modify third party code. 2 software-
overhead is large. 3. can be bypassed by Spectre. 
The main cause of in-process vulnerabilities above 
is that modern processors lack hardware mechanisms 
to check inner-process memory accesses. Traditional 
memory protection is based on process address space 
defined by operating system. Only memory accesses 
across process domains are checked and prevented if 
violations are detected. The memory access boundary 
checking within a process are accomplished by 
software, which is neither complete nor efficient due 
the complexity of software. 
If we only allow the reliable program codes to 
access sensitive critical data, we can prevent 
malicious or buggy untrusted code from inspecting the 
critical data in advance. 
In this paper we propose a novel hardware based 
in-process isolation system called PULP. PULP 
modifies the processor pipeline, especially the 
implementation of load/store instructions, to check 
whether the inner-memory access address is legal. 
PULP separates user process into trusted and 
untrusted parts, limiting the memory access ranges of 
untrusted part. PULP inserts the API function before 
the function calling, which can restrict the data ranges 
that the called function can access. To separate the 
trusted functions from untrusted functions, PULP 
needs also to modify the OS process loader slightly. 
When executing the load/store instruction, PULP 
don’t need additional instructions to check the 
memory address. The software runtime overhead of 
PULP is negligible compared to Intel MPX. 
We use a RISC-V Rocket-chip platform to 
implement our prototype. We add new registers to the 
CPU core, and modify Linux kernel to support 
register configuration and new out of memory bound 
exception handler. The CPU frequency of RISC-V 
remains 62.5 MHz. The hardware comparison results 
show that, the area of PULP is bigger than the old 
rocket chip version by 31%, the cells of PULP is more 
than rocket chip by 2%, the power of PULP is more 
than rocket chip by 28%. 
We choose MIT benchmarks[2] and Heartbleed[3] 
as our security test benchmarks. The benchmark 
sources are modified to add range-adjustment APIs. 
Experimental results show that PULP can effectively 
prevent buffer overflow and memory leakage 
vulnerabilities ahead of time. 
We also use SPEC2006 to test the performance of 
PULP. As the load/store instructions of PULP 
automatically check the memory access address at 
runtime, no additional instruction is needed to check 
the memory address. Results show that PULP incurs 
low runtime overhead (less than 0.1%) to SPEC2006. 
Since Rocket chip is an in-order processor, we 
cannot reproduce Spectre attack, but the in-process 
data isolation mechanism of PULP can effectively 
prevent Spectre, and prohibit the unreliable part of the 
program from gaining the security sensitive data 
whether it is invoked by speculation or not. 
With PULP we contribute the following: 
 We propose a novel inner-process hardware 
based memory protection mechanism PULP. PULP 
provides APIs to prevent the secondary functions 
from accessing critical inner-process memory region. 
 We have implemented a prototype system with 
an enhanced RISC-V CPU core, modified Linux 
kernel as well as a set of APIs to demonstrate 
PULP.  
 We have testified the PULP prototype by both 
functional and performance benchmarks. The result 
shows that PULP can effectively defend buffer 
overflow and Heartbleed problems. 
The rest of the paper is organized as following: in 
section 2 we lay out the motivation of PULP. Section 
3 gives the design and implementation of PULP. 
Section 4 provides the experimental evaluation 
results. We contrast the related work in section 5 and 
conclude the paper in section 6. 
2 Motivation 
2.1 Inner-process Abuse 
Inner-process memory abuse ranges from data 
theft to privilege escalation. Various of user-space 
attacks can succeed once they have penetrated into 
targets’ process context[8], as they can freely access 
(or abuse) target programs' memory content. 
Inner-process abuse is usually caused by improper 
internal memory access, and triggered by many 
unreliable factors inside user process, such as third-
party program, improper function parameters, buffer 
overflow and speculation, etc. Buffer overflow or out 
of bound memory access are the main source of inner-
process abuse. 
Buffers are areas of memory set aside to hold data 
transited from one function to another. Malformed 
inputs like an anomalous transaction that produces 
more data than expected could lead to writes beyond 
the end of the buffer, which is called Buffer 
overflows[12]. If the overflow overwrites adjacent 
data or executable code, it will probably result in 
erratic program behavior, including memory access 
errors, incorrect results, and crashes. 
2.2 Limitation of existing methods 
There are many classic software countermeasures 
against Buffer Overflow, such as Libsafe[14], 
LibsafeXP[4], stack protector[5], stack canaries[17], 
etc. These classic software methods always have 
much large overhead. Though the stack protector has 
little runtime overhead, it can only protect variables in 
the stack. 
Recently there are some hardware and software 
combined methods to achieve inner-process isolation, 
such as Intel MPX[6], Dune[7] and Shreds[8]. Among 
them, Intel MPX has high runtime overhead, and 
because of cross privilege, Dune has difficulty when 
sharing data between the trusted and untrusted parts of 
the process, while Shreds has higher overhead than 
PULP. 
2.3 Main idea of PULP 
The main difficulty for inner-process protection is 
lack of a hardware mechanism to identify different 
address space within a Process. Previously hardware 
assumes all code can access the address space of the 
whole process while leave the software to protect 
itself. Instead of adding complex hardware domains 
within a process, PULP chooses to use the address of 
instruction code to identify a subject. By associating 
the address of instruction with the data address to be 
accessed, a protection check can be enforced by 
hardware with minimum change to the software code.   
3 System design and implementation 
Depending on the reliability of each part of process 
codes, we divided the code region of the process into 
many segments. In this paper, each code segment is a 
function. Before an untrusted function is called, PULP 
binds the function with its accessible memory regions 
by configuring the accessible memory regions in 
special registers. These new registers associate 
function with specific accessible data regions. 
When user process is executed, CPU will check if 
the data access issued by specific function is legal 
according to its bounded data regions indicated by 
registers. Any out of range access attempt will be 
prevented by CPU pipeline. 
To realize this, PULP needs hardware modification 
and software supplement. The hardware modification 
includes newly added registers and processor pipeline 
modification to limit the scope of both load/store 
instructions and control flow direction. 
The software supplement includes three parts, API 
functions, compiler and kernel. The APIs are designed 
to define the accessible range of a specific function. 
The compiler decides which function is the primary 
function, and the data memory ranges the secondary 
function can access. The kernel is modified to support 
the new registers and the new added out of bound 
memory exception. 
As shown in Figure 1, compiler verifies PC range 
of primary function and safe areas of secondary 
function’s input parameters, instruments program with 
inline API. Then the kernel configures the registers. 
Finally the CPU executes the program under specific 
memory access limitation.
… start_protect(addr, len, cfg, 
index);
 // encryption
 end_protect(index);
 ...
    
Code
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Fig. 1: Developers can instrument programs via APIs; Compiler can also automatically 
analyze, detect the primary function range, instrument programs with APIs; during 
startup, Kernel configures the registers; when executing program, CPU limit access ranges of 
data memory access. 
3.1 Hardware design 
3.1.1 new registers 
PULP added three kinds of registers in the CPU 
core, PPCR, SMAR, RAR, which are used to restrict 
the accessible memory ranges of the untrusted code. 
There is one group of primary program counter 
range (PPCR) registers, consist of the starting and 
ending program counter address of the primary 
function. There are several groups of secondary 
memory address range (SMAR) registers, each group 
including one pair of starting and ending address of 
code range. Whenever CPU executes load/store 
instruction, the pipeline looks up these registers, 
confirming whether the load/store instruction is legal. 
There are two rules about the PPCR and SMAR 
registers: 
Rule 1. The primary function could access its local 
variables and all the global variables, while the 
secondary function could only access ranges the 
SMAR registers indicated. 
This rule prevents the secondary functions 
accessing sensitive data in the primary function. 
Rule 2. Only kernel can modify PPCR. Only 
primary function could modify SMAR registers. 
This rule forbids secondary function to configure 
SMAR registers, which assures that unreliable code 
could not change its accessible memory ranges. 
To avoid ROP-like attack, PULP add a return 
address register(RAR) in the CPU core, recording the 
return address of secondary function. When the 
secondary function is called, the return address will be 
stored into RAR. When the secondary function 
returns, the target PC will be compared with PC stored 
in RAR, and mismatch of PC will trigger return-
address-error exception. 
With the help of RAR, we can assure the control 
flow integrity. 
3.1.2 processor pipeline 
In order to realize the address cross-border 
judgement, a series of address comparisons are added 
in the pipeline. If the memory access address or the 
branch target is beyond the specified range, a 
corresponding abnormal signal is generated. We take 
a typical five-stage pipeline as example. 
IF (Instruction fetch). An instruction is fetched 
from the memory by program counter. 
ID (Instruction decode). If the decoded instruction 
is LOAD, STORE, BRANCH or JUMP, PULP will 
judge which region the instruction belongs to, such as 
kernel, primary function or secondary function. 
If in kernel mode, no checking is needed. If in user 
mode, and the PC is within the address range of 
primary function as set in PPCR, no further checking 
is needed. 
Otherwise PC is in the secondary function, 
checking will be needed in the EX stage. 
EX (Execution). According to the results of the ID 
stage, if the instruction is LOAD/STORE and it 
belongs to secondary function, the memory address 
will be checked, and PULP judges whether it is within 
legal memory bounds set in SMAR. 
If the instruction jumps from primary to secondary 
function, the return address will be stored into RAR. 
If the instruction returns from secondary function 
to primary function, PULP compares target address 
with return address stored in the RAR. If they are the 
same, this return is correct. Otherwise this return is 
wrong, PULP will trigger a return address error 
exception. 
WB (Write back). During this stage, the data 
loaded from memory or calculated by the ALU would 
be written to the register file. 
 Software design 
3.2.1 PULP API 
Programmers can use APIs below conveniently to 
deploy PULP: 
start_protect (addr, len,cfg,index); 
end_protect (index); 
start_protect writes the addr into the lower one of 
SMAR registers’ pair, and the sum of addr and len 
into the upper one. The cfg defines the secondary 
function’s permission of the address set in SMAR. 
When running programs, PULP will inquire the 
SMAR registers to see if the following operations are 
within the specific memory. In this way, malicious 
access to memory space would never succeed as they 
will be prevented by PULP, and raise exception. 
The index is needed to indicate specific registers 
used by the current API. 
After invocation of secondary function, 
end_protect API is invoked to clear a SMAR group 
specified by index, so that PULP will not check the 
memory access range anymore. 
To prevent secondary functions modifying SMAR 
registers, special configuration instructions in 
start_protect and end_protect could only be executed 
in primary function. 
3.2.2 Compiler modification 
The compiler computes input parameter’s effective 
data length, and instruments start_protect and 
end_protect APIs before and after the called site of 
the secondary function. 
The compiler also figures out which part of the 
program is primary function, that is, the most trustable 
part of the program, which will guide the kernel to fill 
the values of PPCR registers. 
Moreover, definition for the new instruction to 
manipulate the new registers is added to the compiler. 
 Kernel modification 
Loadelf function in the kernel is modified, to 
configure the PPCR registers. Context switching code 
of kernel is modified, to support the new registers. 
And the new exception handler is added, to handle the 
out of memory bound exception and return-address-
error exception. 
PPCR registers are set by kernel. When loading elf 
file, Linux gets the primary function’s PC ranges in 
the load_binary function, and set them into the PPCR 
registers. 
Furthermore, we added the definition of PULP 
registers in kernel, and updated context-switching 
codes. 
4 Analysis and evaluation 
RISC-V[19,20] is a free and open source 
instruction set architecture (ISA) based on modern 
design techniques and decades of computer 
architecture research. Rocket Chip is an open source 
RISC-V system-on-chip design generator, which is 
highly synthesized and capable of generating RTL 
(Resistor Transistor Logic). To limit the data access 
ranges and control flow direction, we modified the 
RISC-V processor pipeline based on Rocket Chip. 
All the experiments were carried out on the 
modified RISC-V processor with 1G RAM memory 
running Linux kernel 4.6.2, the processor basic 
frequency is 62.5Mhz. 
4.1 Security Evaluation 
4.1.1 Heartbleed attack 
Heartbleed is a security bug in the OpenSSL 
cryptography library, which is a widely used 
implementation of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
protocol. It was introduced into the software in 2012 
and publicly disclosed in April 2014. It results from 
improper input validation (due to a missing bounds 
check) in the implementation of the TLS heartbeat 
extension[13], thus the bug's name derives from 
heartbeat[3]. 
Heartbleed originates in buffer overread 
vulnerabilities, which means reading more data than 
the software approved[16]. The Heartbleed 
vulnerability took the Internet by surprise in April 
2014. The vulnerability allowed attackers to remotely 
read protected memory from an estimated 24–55% of 
popular HTTPS sites. 
We implemented a socket server with the API 
provided by OpenSSL-1.0.1e in C, which initializes 
the socket, SSL library, and waits for the connection 
of client using SSL_accept. 
We wrote a socket client program in C, to 
communicate with socket server. The client sends 
hello request of TLSv1.1 to server, and the connection 
between server and client will be established. 
To replay Heartbleed, we sent a malformed 
Heartbeat request in client. As expected, the server 
replies with excess data that may be secret. 
After deploying PULP in OpenSSL source code, 
that is, putting the memcpy invocation in 
tls1_process_heartbeat under protection, the 
unexpected copy operation raised an exception and 
the process is terminated by kernel. Finally no secret 
data is leaked out. 
4.1.2 MIT benchmarks 
We also used MIT Lincoln Laboratories buffer 
overflow benchmark [2]. It contains model programs 
with and without buffer overflow bugs developed 
from reported vulnerabilities in three real-world open 
source network servers, namely Bind, Wu-ftpd and 
Sendmail. Each of the three application programs has 
several bugs reported in CVE and CERT data bases 
and accordingly captured in the model programs. 
We test 6 cases of MIT benchmark, apply PULP to 
every bad memory operation that may cause 
corruption. Then we test them on platform RISC-V 
without and with PULP. 
Without PULP, these 6 test cases cause memory 
corruption, for example, information leakage, and 
local variables coverage. After deploying PULP, all of 
the illegal operations are prevented and raise 
exception. 
These test cases are got from SARD (Software 
Assurance Reference Dataset)[18]. Their test case id 
numbers are 1283, 1285, 1289, 1291, 1295, 1297 
respectively. 
1283 is Off-by-one overflow from MIT 
benchmarks models/wu-ftpd/f2. 1285 is Realpath() 
overflow from MIT benchmarks models/wu-ftpd/f3. 
1289 is nslookup Complain vulnerability from MIT 
benchmarks models/bind/b4. 1291 is SIG-BUG from 
MIT benchmarks models/bind/b2. 1295 is IQUERY-
BUG from MIT benchmarks models/bind/b3. 1297 is 
Remote Sendmail Header Processing Vulnerability 
from MIT benchmarks models/sendmail/s1. 
4.2 Performance Evaluation 
4.2.1 GCC stack protector 
To evaluate the API configuration overhead of 
PULP, we program two micro benchmarks, both of 
which execute strcpy 10000 times, and the input string 
length of strcpy is 100. 
To compare performance of PULP and stack 
protector, one program is configured with the PULP 
API. And another similar program is compiled with 
GCC option -fstack-protector. 
In Figure 2 we compare execution times of PULP 
and stack protector. The former is 0.29s, the latter is 
0.26s. The execution time of stack protector is less. 
Which is almost the same as original execution time 
without any runtime protection. So the configuration 
time of PULP is less than 15% of the execution time 
of strcpy function, with the input string length is 100. 
The total configuration time of PULP is in 
proportion to the called times of secondary function 
and the numbers of function parameters. If the called 
times of strcpy are fewer, the input string length of 
strcpy is longer, the configuration overhead in the 
total execution time will be relatively lower. 
 
Fig 2. performance test results of the stack 
protector and the PULP. 
GCC stack protector need low time overhead. 
However, GCC stack protector can protect only stack 
variables, while PULP can protect heap variables and 
global variables as well. Table 2 and table 3 give two 
functional test programs of stack protector. The first 
micro benchmark protects variable in the stack. The 
second one protects variable in the heap. 
Table 2 functional test program of stack protector, 
with the protected variable in the stack. 
  #include "stdio.h" 
  #include "string.h" 
  int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
  { 
      int check = 0; 
      char pass[10]; 
      printf("test\n"); 
      strcpy(pass, argv[1]); 
      printf("strcpy done\n"); 
      return 0; 
  } 
Table 3 functional test program of stack protector, 
with the protected variable in the heap. 
 #include "stdio.h" 
 #include "string.h" 
 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
 { 
     int check = 0; 
     char *pass; 
     printf("test\n"); 
     pass = malloc(10); 
     strcpy(pass, argv[1]); 
     printf("strcpy done\n"); 
     return 0; 
 } 
The above programs’ execution results are shown 
in Figure 3 and Figure 4. In Figure 3 stack protector 
protects stack variable successfully. In Figure 4 stack 
protector cannot protect variables in the heap. 
Moreover, GCC stack protector can only check stack 
variable after the function execution finished. The 
checkout time may be too late for some security 
applications. 
 
Fig 3 functional test succeeded in protecting 
variable in the stack 
Fig 4 functional test failed in protecting variable in 
the heap 
4.2.2 SPEC2006 
In the SPEC2006 benchmarks, we added 
start_protect API function before the secondary 
function called, and end_protect API function after 
the secondary function returned. We selected printf, 
fprintf, memset, strcpy, sprintf as unreliable secondary 
functions. 
We choose bzip2, mcf, libquantum as our test 
benchmarks. We use the test level input data for these 
benchmarks. Results show that the PULP 
configuration overhead is almost negligible, the total 
overhead of the PULP is less than 0.1% of the total 
execution runtime. The reason is that PULP is 
implemented on the basis of hardware check and the 
selected secondary functions are not called very 
frequently. So the configuration overhead is low 
compared to overall execution time. 
 Figure 5 shows the execution time comparison of 
old RISC-V and PULP. Their execution time are 
almost the same. 
Fig 5 the SPEC2006 execution seconds of OLD 
version RISC-V and PULP 
4.3 Hardware Cost Evaluation 
Table 4 gives the hardware comparison results of 
old rocket chip and PULP. The area of PULP is bigger 
than the old rocket chip version by 31%. The cells of 
PULP is more than rocket chip by 2%. The power of 
PULP is more than rocket chip by 28%. 
Table 4 hardware comparison results of RISC-V 
old version and PULP 
 
Area(um²) Cells Power(W) 
Old 53382 11648 3.543 
PULP 69959 11885 4.540 
5. Related works 
5.1 Classic software measurements 
against Buffer Overflow 
Stack canaries are special values stored in stack 
frames between the return address and local variables 
[17]. A contiguous stack buffer overflow would 
overwrite the stack canary, which is checked for 
intactness before the RETs of vulnerable functions. 
Libsafe replaces the dynamic link library with new 
one [14]. Libsafe is a run-time solution that inserts 
wrapper code to estimate the maximum safe size for 
each destination buffer at the start of functions that are 
deemed to be vulnerable to buffer overflows. If the 
size of the data written to the destination buffer does 
not exceed the maximum safe size, then no return 
addresses can be overwritten. 
LibsafeXP divides memory regions into global 
buffers, dynamically allocated heap buffers and stack 
buffers[4]. The global buffer’s size and starting 
address are extracted from the symbol table section of 
ELF executable file, and dynamically allocated heap 
buffer’s size and location information are tracked at 
run-time in the intercepted malloc family functions. 
The stack protector implemented in GCC and 
clang adds an additional guard variable to each 
function’s stack area[5]. The variable is initialized 
with a special value on function entry, and checked 
again on exit. Once the value has changed, the 
program aborts to prevent further damage. Adding 
0
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these checks will lead to a little runtime overhead. The 
main drawback of stack protector is it can protect only 
variables in the stack. 
5.2 Memory Protection Extensions 
(MPX) 
Intel MPX [6] is a hardware accelerated memory 
corruption detection and prevention system. MPX 
requires program recompilation and library 
recompilation for full mitigation. The recompilation 
adds explicit instructions to the CPU for performing 
memory corruption checks. However, MPX has up to 
4x overhead in RAM if the program has lots of 
pointers (trees, lists, graphs, etc). 
5.3 Other In-process security techniques 
Dune [7] is a system that provides applications 
with direct but safe access to hardware features such 
as ring protection, page tables, and tagged TLBs, 
while preserving the existing OS interfaces for 
processes. It consists of a small kernel module that 
initializes virtualization hardware and mediates 
interactions with the kernel, and a user-level library 
that helps applications manage privileged hardware 
features. 
Shreds [8] is proposed to protect secret data (e.g., 
crypto keys and user passwords) and critical codes 
(e.g., private APIs and privileged functions). A shred 
can be viewed as a flexibly defined segment of a 
thread execution. Shreds offer in-process private 
memory without relying on separate page tables, 
nested paging, or even modified hardware based on 
ARM memory domains. 
5.4 Comparison of in-process isolation 
techniques 
In Table 5, we list the features of techniques 
above, and compare the performance overhead and 
shortcomings of these techniques. 
Table 5 features of recent isolation techniques 
 In-process security 
Memory bound 
check 
Hardening 
c/c++ programs 
wrapper functions 
checkout 
techniques shreds Dune MPX Stack protector LibsafeXP 
characteristics 
ARM DACR holds 
the access 
permissions for 16 
domains, to isolate 
sensitive data 
VT-x provides 
user programs 
with full access 
to protection 
hardware 
dynamic 
detection and 
prevention of 
out of bound 
memory access  
adds an 
additional guard 
variable to each 
function’s stack 
area 
Contains wrapper 
functions for 
buffer related 
functions in C 
standard 
library, enforces 
bounds checking 
performance 
overhead 
4.67% for open-
source applications 
sandbox 
overhead is 
2.9% for SPEC 
4x low 10% 
shortcoming 
use system call to 
overwrite the page 
protection. 
cross privilege 
levels data 
sharing is not 
fast 
runtime 
overhead is high 
only protect 
stack variables 
need additional 
instructions to 
check buffer 
bounds 
6. Conclusion 
Based on hardware modification to the CPU 
architecture, PULP is an efficient user level in-process 
memory isolation system. Experimental results show 
that PULP could prevent in-process abuse attacks, 
with little overhead.   
Better than most of software countermeasures of 
buffer overflow, such as Intel MPX, PULP can reduce 
software runtime overhead substantially. As long as 
PULP doesn’t need additional instructions to check 
the memory access address, the runtime overhead of 
PULP is negligible. 
Like Dune, PULP classifies user process into 
reliable primary functions and untrusted secondary 
functions, endowing different privileges to the two 
parts, realizing in-process data isolation, finally 
improving the security of user process. 
Like shreds, PULP can realize in-process and 
thread-level isolation. Unlike shreds and Dune, PULP 
doesn’t need kernel mode interference to achieve 
memory isolation. PULP doesn’t need to step in 
kernel mode to change the hardware virtualization 
registers, so PULP can save much operating system 
runtime overhead, such as context switching 
overhead. 
  
References 
[1] Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Daniel Gruss, 
Werner Haas, Mike Hamburg, Moritz Lipp, Stefan 
Mangard, Thomas Prescher, Michael Schwarz, Yuval 
Yarom "Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative 
Execution. " arXiv:1801.01203 [cs.CR] 
[2] Zitser, Misha, R. Lippmann, and T. Leek. "Testing 
static analysis tools using exploitable buffer overflows 
from open source code. " ACM Sigsoft Twelfth 
International Symposium on Foundations of Software 
Engineering ACM, 2004:97-106. 
[3] Limer, Eric .  "How Heartbleed Works: The Code 
Behind the Internet's Security Nightmare. " Retrieved 
January 15, 2018.  
[4] Lin, Zhiqiang, B. Mao, and L. Xie. "LibsafeXP: A 
Practical and Transparent Tool for Run-time Buffer 
Overflow Preventions." Information Assurance 
Workshop IEEE Xplore, 2006:332-339. 
[5] http://www.productive-cpp.com/hardening-cpp-
programs-stack-protector/. Retrieved January 15, 
2018. 
[6] Otterstad, C. W. "A brief evaluation of 
Intel®MPX." Systems Conference IEEE, 2015:1-7. 
[7] Belay, Adam, et al. "Dune: safe user-level access 
to privileged CPU features." Usenix Conference on 
Operating Systems Design and Implementation 
USENIX Association, 2012:335-348. 
[8] Chen, Yaohui, et al. "Shreds: Fine-Grained 
Execution Units with Private Memory." Security and 
Privacy IEEE, 2016:56-71. 
[9] Zhang, Liang, et al. "Analysis of SSL certificate 
reissues and revocations in the wake of heartbleed." 
Conference on Internet Measurement Conference 
ACM, 2014:489-502. 
[12] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buffer_overflow.  
Retrieved January 15, 2018. 
[13] "Cyberoam Security Advisory – Heartbleed 
Vulnerability in OpenSSL. " April 11, 2014. 
Retrieved January 15, 2018.  
[14] Tsai, Timothy K., and N. Singh. "Libsafe: 
Transparent System-wide Protection Against Buffer 
Overflow Attacks." International Conference on 
Dependable Systems and Networks IEEE Computer 
Society, 2002:541. 
[15] "CVE – CVE-2014-0160. " Cve.mitre.org. 
Retrieved January 15, 2018.  
[16] "CWE – CWE-126: Buffer Over-read (2.6). " 
Cwe.mitre.org. February 18, 2014. Retrieved January 
15, 2018. 
[17] Dang, T. H. Y., Maniatis, P., Wagner, D. "The 
Performance Cost of Shadow Stacks and Stack 
Canaries." ACM Symposium on Information, 
Computer and Communications Security ACM, 
2015:555-566. 
[18] https://samate.nist.gov/SRD/index.php  
Retrieved January 15, 2014. 
[19] "The RISC-V Instruction Set Manual ."  
Volume II: Privileged Architecture  Version 1.9.1 
[20] "The RISC-V Instruction Set Manual."  Volume 
I: User-Level ISA  Version 
